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Challenges in Mali, the Importance of Legitimate Governance
in Combatting Terrorism and Violent Extremism
Abstract
The Greater Sahel is one of the world’s most troubled regions. Within the region, Mali is
the regional lynchpin and has been the focus of French efforts to eradicate terrorist
groups. The essay seeks to answer the question, “Why has violence increased and terrorist
cells continued to thrive in Mali despite international efforts?” Although the issue is more
complicated and nuanced, corruption and poor governance are significant factors in
increased violence. Local leaders focus on militarization and violent suppression to
maintain control over larger cities while neglecting rural communities. These actions
undermine the government’s legitimacy, exacerbated by rampant corruption. Secondary
sources and conflict databases are utilized to provide quantitative analysis while also using
a qualitative lens to factor in governance and engagement of the public, which are more
challenging to measure. The essay provides an overview of the challenges, followed by a
background of UN training missions in the Sahel and a cursory history and regional
challenges. An analysis of the French withdrawal from Mali highlights the challenges of
foreign governments. The conclusion provides suggestions for future missions in the
region, focusing on governance, basic human rights, infrastructure, and essential services
for the population.
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Introduction
For many reasons, the Greater Sahel is one of the world’s most troubled
regions. However, all the challenges stem from increased violence due to
militant groups, exacerbating a growing humanitarian crisis. The plight in
the Sahel receives more scrutiny in Europe simply because of its
geographic proximity to the region and internal concerns over African
migrants who flee their homes in front of the wave of violence driven by
criminal groups and religious extremists.1 This is at least part of the reason
the region requires global attention and coordinated response to create
what Jean-Marie Guéhenno labeled an international conflict prevention
strategy that is inclusive and supports the state’s internal structure, which
is the primary building block of development.2 Fragile political
institutions, food and water insecurity, and armed groups have created a
humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 4.2 million people.
Furthermore, international and African counterterrorism missions have
created a “war on terror” in ungoverned spaces that has only exacerbated
the situation.3 In 2016, jihadist groups launched large-scale attacks in
Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Côte d’Ivoire, highlighting the region’s
tenuous security environment.4 International attention falls to Mali, the
epicenter of violence and terrorist groups. Malian forces maintain a heavy
military and police footprint in major urban centers, though even these are
within reach of terrorist groups. Remote ungoverned space in Mali
provides safe havens for terrorists and criminal groups that have proven
difficult for the state to eradicate. Their proliferation has further
undermined the government’s legitimacy.5 Héni Nsaibia pointedly wrote,
“Mali remains at the crossroads of hope and uncertainty.”6 The violence
has also erupted in dense population centers that the state controls and
considers safe, which has generated panic in Mali’s fragile government
that was previously content to exercise limited to minimal control in
remote areas.
In 2017 experts predicted that Mali would face a significant crisis, and the
growing threat of Boko Haram could further destabilize the region. Mali
has indeed suffered from decades of neglect, and the last few years have
been some of the worst in recent history. After a series of two military coup
d’états in Mali in 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron finally had
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enough and terminated Operation Barkhane in June 2021. This essay
demonstrates that the increased violence in the region was exacerbated by
myopic policies driven by the European community and other
international donors that focus on counterterrorism and supporting
authoritarian leaders while placing a lower priority on governance and
improving central infrastructure to support the needs of the people. The
overarching challenges and problems of terrorist groups and violence are
made worse by Western intentions focusing on military solutions, which
undermine the importance of good governance.7 While the Malian
government historically exercised control over the major cities such as the
capital of Bamako and other major urban centers that have been
threatened by terrorist cells over the past few years, which has directly
threatened the ruling regime. In June 2019, after a massacre of 160 people
in the Muslim Fulani ethnic group in the village of Ogossagou, 30,000
protestors demonstrated against Mali’s government in the capital of
Bamako because of its inability to address ethnic violence.8 The
government’s tenuous hold on most of the country has only weakened over
the past few years, despite international efforts to stabilize the
government.
Since Mali is a former French colony, they have historically led
counterterrorism efforts in the region and paid lip service to democratic
principles. However, in the same breath, they support oppressive leaders
who are increasingly disengaged from the population, which has become
more disenfranchised over time. France is not the only country guilty of
such behavior. The US and other countries in the European Union (EU)
mimic similar language and actions. Existing missions in the Sahel and
Mali specifically are ineffective for three reasons.
The first is a lack of coordination among the various agencies and
programs--the United Nations (UN) mission should be the natural
coordinating agency. However, it lacks the framework to demarcate lines
of effort and a division of labor among agencies. The second focuses on
treating the region’s symptoms rather than the root cause of violence:
economic development, opportunities, good governance, economic
equality, and a transparent judicial process that holds people accountable.
The centerpiece for the region must involve the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). Improvements in these sectors would also
encourage foreign direct investment (FDI), promote infrastructure
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projects, and reduce the appeal of terrorist organizations to young people.
Economics and infrastructure must be a central framework for Malians,
demanding that more significant funding is directed towards
infrastructure improvements that benefit the people. In Mali, for example,
military spending is snowballing and outpacing crucial infrastructure
projects as a percentage of GDP.
Lastly, aid must be tied to the meaningful reduction of corruption and
changes that promote transparency. This issue marginalizes the people
and further fuels ethnoreligious violence in the Sahel. This manuscript
seeks to answer the question, “Why has violence increased and terrorist
cells continued to thrive in Mali despite international efforts?” It is divided
into three sections. The first will provide a background or context for the
Sahel over the past decade culminating with the French announcement of
ending the Barkhane mission in June 2021. The following section will
analyze existing programs and policy recommendations for the future,
followed by a conclusion and the consequences or impact if changes are
not implemented.

Background
Africa is home to the largest concentration of UN soldiers on any
continent. There are ongoing UN missions in Mali, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Western Sahara,
Abyei, and South Sudan.9 As of October 2021, there were 16,598 UN
personnel deployed to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), an endeavor that began in July
2013 to stabilize Mali and help restructure the government.10 MINUSMA
has had limited success in its peacebuilding and peacekeeping role in
reducing conflict, though humanitarian intervention has been the central
focus of the UN. Critics suggest that the structure of the UN is part of the
problem as it lacks a command system capable of rapid decision-making
and coordination with the numerous forces and contingents involved in
the Sahel. It is also concerning that Mali’s violence has reached a high
watermark over the past few years, despite the heavy concentration of
forces from the UN, Europe, and other African countries. In 2018, of
Mali’s population of 18.6 million, 335,000 were forced to flee their
homes.11 Furthermore, in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, violence
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increased dramatically in 2021 to 2,500 incidents and 6,000 deaths.12 If
anything, it is clear that the security environment has grown much worse.
The military missions show slight improvement, though the shocking rise
of coups and coup attempts suggests much more going on in the Sahel. As
of July 21, 2020, 84,000 refugees and 570,000 displaced people returned
to their homes in Mali, which, on the surface, suggests that the MINUSMA
mission is compelling.13 However, overall, the crisis and fatalities from
armed groups in 2020 reflected a five-year increase in Mali, Burkina Faso,
and Niger.14 According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), as of
October 2020, deteriorating conditions in the central Sahel states of
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger increased almost 60% in the wake of the
COVID-19 epidemic, with a record of 13.4 million people requiring
humanitarian assistance.15 Other studies that focus on violence in the
region were equally stark. As of 2020, the Armed Conflict Location &
Event Data Project (ACLED) reported 2,400 civilian deaths in Burkina
Faso, Mali, and Niger, one of the deadliest years in recent history.16
Insurgent groups continue to thrive in the region and have expanded their
networks and areas of operation over the past few years.
Mali continued to be the epicenter of the crisis and went through two
military coup d’états in 2020, one of the worst years in recent history.17
Between the middle of 2020 and early 2022, there were five coups in
Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, and two failed attempts in
Guinea-Bissau and Niger.18 Other areas in the Sahel have also deteriorated
precipitously, though environmental conditions and the COVID-19
epidemic were also factors. According to Paul Taylor, Regional Vice
President for West Africa at the IRC:
This is not the same crisis it has historically been. Civilians in the
Central Sahel are worse off in 2020 by nearly every measure—more
likely to need humanitarian aid, be displaced, face food insecurity,
or die from conflict—than at any other point in the previous decade.
More than 7 million people are acutely food insecure – a tripling
since last year – and this number is expected to grow to almost 13
million by the end of this year. In 2019, civilian deaths in the region
rose by a staggering 1,870% compared to 2016, with civilian deaths
linked to militias increasing by 8,500% in just four years from 2015
to 2019.19
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The situation in the Sahel has worsened, with environmental stress caused
by altered rainfall patterns, damaging floods, and droughts, generating
conflict among the agricultural and pastoral communities in the region,
according to a September 2020 press release by the UN Security Council.20
The Islamic State in the Great Sahara (ISGS), Boko Haram, which now
calls itself the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and the Al
Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) continue
to exacerbate regional tensions and the stabilization and protection of
civilians have decreased, undermining the credibility of MINUSMA.
Furthermore, due to confusion and misinterpretation over the mission and
scope of the MINUSMA (established in 2013 after the Tuareg rebellion in
2012), UN leadership views the operation through the lens of
counterterrorism versus one that needs to support the government and
state.21
Five countries in the Sahel, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and
Niger, formed the G5 Sahel (G5S) on February 16, 2014, to increase
cooperation on economic policies and security issues in West Africa. The
G5S has been marred by allegations of abuse and corruption, primarily
centered on Chad’s military. In August 2014, France launched a large
counterterrorism mission, Operation Barkhane, with 3,000 soldiers in the
G5 Sahel.
To address the challenges in the region with Boko Haram, in April 2012,
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin retooled the Multinational
Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which was initially formed in 1994.22 However,
it became much more active in 2015. The most significant change in the
MNJTTF in 2015 was increased resources and the fact that it would fall
under the supervision of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. It operates
10,000 troops under an African Union Peace and Security Council
mandate. The US and the EU are the largest donors to the MNJTF. The
MNJTF had achieved some traction in 2015-2016, though the gains were
lost in 2018-2019 when Boko Haram attacked an MNJTF base and killed
90 soldiers in March 2020.23 This attack underscored the reach of terrorist
groups and undermined the credibility of the MNJTF undertaking because
it has repeatedly failed to stop killing innocent civilians. One example
occurred in late 2020 when dozens of farmers in Nigeria’s Borneo State
26
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were killed.24 Adding more challenges to the MNJTF, Chad’s leaders felt
that they were bearing the burden of the force, and they pulled 1,000
troops from Nigeria in 2020.25 The reduction of troops undermined the
effectiveness of the MNJTF, which was precarious at best.
On March 27, 2020, European countries banded together to support the
French Barkhane operation by forming a new task force, Takuba. Belgium,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Mali, Niger, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
dedicated resources to support Task Force Takuba to combat terrorism in
eastern Burkina Faso, southwestern Niger, and central Mali. Task Force
Takuba was also to work in coordination with the G5S, MINUSMA, and
the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali). In addition to
these missions, several others pursue various security goals in the region,
such as the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP
Sahel Mali) and EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel
Niger). The programs were established between 2013 and 2014 to bolster
civilian, military, and law enforcement capabilities.26 While it might
appear that there was a bit of overlap and redundancy in the EU missions
in the Sahel, the Takuba mission was designed to deploy EU military
personnel to the field and fill a gap in the restrictions imposed by the
EUTM.27
In May 2021, Mali leadership announced a new interim president and
prime minister nine months after the last coup d'état on August 18,
2020.28 In June 2021, the French announced they were canceling the
Barkane mission in the Sahel, which began in August of 2014 to replace
Operation Serval (2002-2014), designed to remove Islamic militants in
northern Mali. The abrupt cessation of Barkhane reflects unmet French
demands that states in the region take on greater security and governance
responsibilities for themselves, particularly following Mali’s May 2020
coup and the subsequent coup in August 2021. Two coups within nine
months probably shaped France’s decision to end its operations in the
region the following month in June of 2021. In August 2021, Chad
announced that it recalled half of its troop allocation, or 600 soldiers, from
the G5S to better position them to counter terrorist threats in other
areas.29 France also announced reducing its troop footprint from 5,100 to
3,000-2,500, though French soldiers will operate out of Niger and
abandon Mali altogether.30 Emmanuel Macron stated that he would
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gradually withdraw France’s soldiers over several years and shift the
mission to a broader international coalition but burdened the countries
that required assistance.31 Macron told a reporter that France was
unwilling to continue working in Mali, a country “where there was no
democratic legitimacy or transition.”32 The French reduction in the region
will have a wide-ranging impact as it was the principal proponent of
intelligence and logistics capabilities crucial to other military operations in
the Sahel, supporting the MINUMSA and G5S missions.33 The big concern
over Mali is that France is curtailing a large force without having a firm
plan for incorporating its essential elements of responsibility into other
partner missions, which will only make the programs harder to maintain
and exert the pressure needed for governmental reforms in Mali. Over the
next few years, Mali may continue to slip precipitously towards the edge of
becoming a failed state.
By ending its long-standing Barkane mission, France highlighted the host
of frustrations by the international community regarding failed
governance and corruption. Countries operating in the region have
neglected to hold leaders accountable and ignore or downplay the abuse
and excessive violence used by military and police forces which
undermines the government’s credibility in the people’s eyes, ultimately
eroding public confidence in the system. Although the international
community talks about improving governance, little takes place in the way
of meaningful changes and policies that improve the daily lives of the
people of Mali.34
Much like the US challenges in Afghanistan, the French and American
people have lost patience with distance missions that divert funding and
priorities from home countries. The military and government have
marginalized the people through often heavy-handed responses with
military personnel. The Human Rights Watch found that security
personnel suspected over 250 unlawful killings of alleged terrorist
suspects and civilians between December 2019 and August 2020.35 While
most Malian people would prefer democracy, 75%, according to the
Afrobarometer, the population is frustrated with instability and graft that
they are willing to give anyone a chance to lead if there is a remote
possibility that they are less corrupt.36
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Despite the heavy UN footprint, Mali remains the epicenter of armed
conflict in the Sahel. In fact, for most Malians, the government’s failure
under former President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2020 partially
fueled the military coup that took place in the same month, highlighting
the people’s frustration after decades of mismanagement.37 Some analysts
conclude that poverty, weak governance coupled with economic disparity,
and a sizeable Muslim population distort and exaggerate the region’s
pressing concerns while creating policy outcomes of negligible value.38

Analysis
As the regional leader, France must coordinate with other EU and partner
countries to ensure that security gains are not entirely erased by drawing
down forces. Germany, which has 1,500 soldiers in Mali, 1,200 of which
work for MINUSMA, expressed doubts about remaining part of the UN
mission in Mali without France.39 Several neighboring countries expressed
concerns about a lack of UN presence in Mali and the potential for a
worsening security environment. French leaders signaled that the new
leadership in Mali created multiple obstructions and eroded the possibility
of victory over terrorist organizations.40
The rising anti-French sentiment in Mali created openings for nonEuropean actors who were working ineffectively to promote the interests
of the Malian people. Unfortunately, it might be too late as Mali has
turned to the Russian Wagner Group to fill the void, arguing that it must
diversify its partnerships. However, mercenaries are only interested in
profit and have little interest in achieving overarching principles and
regional stability. Mali’s leaders agreed with Wagner Group for at least
1,000 mercenaries in a $10.8 million (US) contract to train the military
and provide security escorts for senior leaders.41
What has happened traditionally is that the focus on military operations
emboldens and elevates the status of the military above other agencies,
undermining the legitimacy of the government. Furthermore, a lack of
economic opportunities and poor infrastructure erode public confidence.
Venturi & Barana argued that terrorist groups “capitalized on losing
livelihoods and economic woes to recruit people into its ranks. It has also
worked to establish authority, improve service delivery, and encourage
communities’ trust in areas it controls.”42 The death toll has increased
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significantly over the past few years, according to the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP), an organization based in Sweden that tracks
violence and conflict worldwide. In 2017, according to UCDP, there were
605 deaths caused by state-based or non-state-based violence.43 In the
three years from 2018 to 2020, the total number of deaths spiked to 4,002,
or 1,282 in 2018, 1,227 in 2019, and 1493 in 2020, far exceeding the deaths
since 1990 (registered at 582).44
Among the countries in the Sahel, Chad has played an important
leadership role in the region, providing most of the troops for
counterterrorism efforts, despite allegations of misdeeds by Chadian
forces. Chad is seen as a reliable, albeit authoritarian, country that the
international community values, though its requests urging Chad’s leaders
to embrace diversity in the military and improve relations with the civilian
community have produced negligible results.45 Chad’s President Idriss
Deby was killed in April 2021 while visiting troops in the field, while his
son, Mahamat Idriss Deby, has assumed the leadership role.46 Chad’s
opposition parties requested joint dialogue with the ruling Zaghawa clan,
who control the military and benefit from Chad’s natural resources and
appear unlikely to offer any concessions.47 The new government will likely
be just as authoritarian as the old one, cracking down on political freedom
and human rights. The new government presented an opportunity for
France and the rest of Europe to hold leaders accountable and encourage
human rights and democratic principles as a condition for aid and
support. However, it appears that President Macron was elected to
continue the status quo with Chad.
Despite having achieved some meaningful results, all the missions in Mali
and the Sahel are ultimately failures. For example, when one leader of a
terrorist group is killed, another emerges. Although several missions work
towards the same goals, they are not coordinated and only treat the
symptoms of the problem, which is the growth of terrorism. Root cause
analysis would find that the foundation of social upheaval is rooted in
rampant poverty, economic inequality, and a lack of services.
Authoritarian leaders are out of touch with the people, corrupt, and
nepotists, all factors that undermine social order.
While France and American leaders talk about good governance, the talk is
superficial, and aid is not meaningfully tied to political reform that could
30
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create lasting change in the region and improve society. As Morten Bøås
and Francesco Strazzari wrote, “It is in this social space, where state
institutions have always been distant and often proven inefficient in
building and maintaining governance that delivers public goods to local
populations while new material and ideological resources” such as
humanitarian aid, services, and education where some jihadist
insurgencies are creating a niche for themselves based on an altered social
contract.48 The lack of social services in much of Mali undermines the
government and alienates the people. At the same time, local leaders and
warlords only need to provide the most rudimentary services to garner
public support.
International donors worldwide can quickly become frustrated dealing
with governments such as the one in Mali that is corrupt and incompetent.
However, due to the suppression of other leaders in the country, these key
figures are the only ones who exert any influence. In areas outside the city,
the state has a reduced ability to ensure security and regulate social
disturbances. Rural regions or ungoverned spaces provide opportunities
where illicit actors can provide a flow of illegal money in the region to feed
social mobility, improving local stability through undermining the
government; in some cases, they also form a shadow black-market
economy that provides some opportunities for the local community which
is more than the state can offer.49
While American and European influence in Mali is waning, drawing
lessons to avoid a similar fate in another country is crucial. The bottom
line is that civilian and military responses must be balanced in such a way
as to reinforce the rule of law and fair and equitable treatment of all
citizens. Outside agencies must work with local officials who have the
connections to get things done, making options very limited. Furthermore,
those influential figures in Mali are also some of the most corrupt, forcing
outside agencies to “bargain with the devil” to achieve limited objectives.
However, this process undermines the confidence of the general
population. France and the UN were forced to engage corrupt leaders who
were the least bad option rather than engage marginalized leaders in Mali
who did not have the influence to help facilitate training and secure
supplies for programs designed to enhance training for the military and
law enforcement officials.
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Human rights abuse by deployed troops in the Sahel continues to be an
issue. In 2015, the African Union (AU) authorized the restructuring of the
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), initially formed in 1994 but has
struggled to enforce oversight of the force and lacks the legal framework to
do so.50 The EU provides funding for the mission, but neither the EU nor
the AU managed as a condition for funding the mechanism to hold troops
accountable for their actions which means that international partners are
“turning a blind eye on the malpractices unfolding in the region,” which
has the potential to incentivize more dysfunctional patterns and practices
of regional security forces and regimes.51 Military and civilian
accountability is crucial to regaining the population’s trust and restoring
legitimacy to the host of programs operating in the Sahel.
The biggest challenge in the Sahel is the number of missions and overlap,
though many suffer from insufficient resources. Even though African and
European countries lead several programs, militants, security, terrorism,
corruption, and human trafficking remain a problem. Overall coordination
and specialization of each mission would produce better results. In this
way, a comprehensive regional task-sharing can coordinate French, US,
and EU missions under the umbrella of the UN that would sit at the apex
and provide overall harmonization and oversee the efforts of regional
actors. One of the biggest challenges is that there is no clear framework for
dividing labor among organizations, and personalities and egos can be a
barrier to redesigning a holistic framework and synchronizing
international efforts. Another is that regional organizations’ nature is that
“their inherent predispositions and proclivities—severely limit their role in
the resolution of internal conflicts.”52
A more significant concern is that the missions are directed towards the
symptoms of a much larger problem: economic
development/opportunities, good governance, economic equality, and a
transparent judicial process that holds people accountable, which means
that ECOWAS must assume a central role. Improvements in these sectors
would also encourage FDI, promote infrastructure projects, and reduce the
appeal of terrorist organizations for young people.
The growth of armed insurgents in the Sahel, despite the host of missions
designed to eliminate them, should signal the need to reassess the
situation, look for the crisis’s root cause(s), and encourage transparent
32
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military operations across all mission sets to better coordinate future
operations. Furthermore, studies have demonstrated that insurgent
groups are not all driven by the same motivations. Bøås & Strazzari,
expanding on a list first proposed by Christopher Clapham in 1998,
suggested that all modern movements can be broken into four categories:
separatist insurgencies such as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front,
reformists (e.g., Museveni’s National Resistance Army in Uganda),
warlord insurgencies fighting for power and influence (Froday Sankoh’s
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, and lastly, groups fighting
strictly for profit (they have suggested this last grouping).53 While armed
non-state actors are increasingly common, the government should
approach those that are influential and support governmental reform and
the reduction of corruption. A good example was the transitional Prime
Minister of Mali, Moctar Ouane, who said in 2020 that Mali would talk to
jihadi groups. However, French officials and President Macron publicly
rejected any formal discussions between Mali’s government and terrorist
groups.54 In 2020 the Institute for Security Studies surveyed people
around the Sahel and found that large community groups supported the
government talking to terrorists. However, pockets still feel it would be a
sign of weakness if the government did so.55 As Nsaibia has suggested, the
escalation of violence in the area continues to increase despite
international and regional efforts to stem the flood of violence should be
taken as an indication that exploring new avenues and talking with
terrorists might be productive.56 Such discussions have proven fruitful in
other conflicts, such as the violence in Northern Ireland. The British
government finally relented under Tony Blair’s New Labor Party to talk to
IRA members considered terrorists by many in the British government.57
The US, Europe, and regional leaders in the Sahel should redesign their
objectives, placing ECOWAS in a central role in their place. ECOWAS is a
regional political and economic organization formed by fifteen countries to
establish an integrated monetary and trade union in 1975. ECOWAS has
had limited success, primarily due to political instability, social unrest, and
terrorist groups. Nevertheless, international partners can work more
closely with ECOWAS, an African-led program to increase pro-democracy
protocols and other programs.58
Member states have sent military resources to bolster regions during
political instability. ECOWAS maintains a solid regional reputation despite
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military coup d'états continuing to derail progress in member countries.
Four coup d'états took place in ECOWAS member states in 2020 alone
(two successful coups in Mali and coup attempts in Niger and Guinea).
Despite these challenges, ECOWAS continues to operate and has several
institutions to promote economic cooperation, such as an investment and
development bank and projects geared towards improving industries in
science and technology. Improvements and changes would need to be
made because West Africa and Central Africa are separate regional
economic communities (REC), making cooperation more difficult.59

Conclusion
While illicit actors abound in the Sahel, the reality is that the people in the
region lack civil and political rights. The Malian people cannot address
their needs for health, welfare, and employment opportunities without
fear from the state.60 All international aid focuses on military interests
centered on illicit activities and extremist groups. For example, in 2020,
the US allocated $79 million in foreign development assistance, although
only one percent was directed towards governance projects.61 Groups that
fall under the terrorist designation operate within the Sahel and Mali.
However, some are working to advance the people’s interests by
“challenging local, regional, and national government over issues of
corruption, marginalization, political exclusion and mismanagement.”62 In
some cases, corrupt government officials distort the narrative and
objectives of militant groups to eliminate threats to their rule. This subject
is not well studied and must be conducted to develop a comprehensive and
meaningful approach to stemming the wave of violence in Mali and the
Sahel.
The example of Mali is illustrative for the region regarding spending and
budget allocations for defense versus infrastructure. As of 2012, Mali has
doubled its spending on the military as a percentage of GDP, yet
infrastructure projects lag far behind.63 Some analysts suggest that
Western countries are complicit in Mali for “the lack of security because
they chose to extol the power-sharing agreement between President
Ahmed Tourmani Toure and key military and opposition parties in 2002,
instead of recognizing its disenfranchising elements.”64 While there is a
need for a solid military for counterterrorism, funding must be increased
to provide infrastructure for the Malian people and improve appropriately.
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Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2022

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 15, No. 3

The paltry percentage allocated to governance must be re-examined.
Furthermore, government oversight and programs are crucial to holding
military and civilian leaders accountable for corruption and abuse of their
authority.65
Greater coordination and a central role for the UN must be established for
future missions in the Sahel. This will require several changes and
multilateral cooperation between the US, France, Europe, and the UN.
For example, efforts in Mali were initially designed toward peacekeeping
and stability while fostering good governance. Isaac Kfir argues that while
fighting terrorists and training military personnel, Western countries have
poured weapons and equipment into a region, making the environment
more militarized while promoting violence to resolve differences; this
erodes social order while supporting corrupt authoritarian leaders.66
While countering terrorist groups is a Western priority, underlying state
legitimacy, and local infrastructure are the most important for Malians,
though those programs are lightly funded. These priorities must be
realigned. Placing ECOWAS as the keystone for future policies can
facilitate economic development.
Given the upward spiral of violence in the Sahel, the time was never more
urgent to re-examine the framework and objectives of the host of missions
to focus on balancing military objectives with those that support
accountable governance responsible for the needs of the people. Funding
should be increased to support government policies and infrastructure
projects and hold leaders accountable with a transparent system.
Countries in the Sahel are desperate for financial aid and investment, and
Western donors must do more than talk about governmental reform and
reducing corruption. Resources must be withdrawn if substantive changes
are not implemented. If this 180-degree adjustment is not made, local
warlords will quickly capitalize on the hardship experienced by the
Malians and the economic disparity, further increasing violence.
While governance is the keystone for Mali and the Sahel, other factors may
complicate the future and provide more significant areas for the insurgent
group to undermine weak governments and infrastructure. A case in point
will be climate change and droughts that will stress the Malian people and
highlight poor infrastructure and social programs that are ineffective at
supporting large segments of the population at the edge of survival. Due to
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global temperature increases and reduced rainfall, the Sahel region is
expanding south by 1,400 square miles yearly, reducing arable land and
forcing hundreds of thousands of farmers to migrate.67 According to
projections by the UN, by 2025, more than 2.8 billion people in 48
countries will suffer from water scarcity or water stress. An estimated “230
million Africans will face water scarcity, and 460 million will live in waterstressed countries.”68 The time for new policies in the Sahel was never
more urgent.
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